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IN THE 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
No. 9360 




UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This proceeding involves the question of whether or not 
the plaintiff is liable for the payment of a use tax upon 
certain items of tangible personal property used in the con-
struction of an ammonium nitrate plant at or near Geneva, 
Utah in 1956. 
Plaintiff, The Chemical and Industrial Corporation, is an 
Ohio corporation engaged in the business of designing and 
contracting for the erection of facilities for the production 
of chemical and allied products. Plaintiff is not now, and 
was not, during the period January 1, 1956 to December 31, 
1956, authorized or qualified to do business in the State of 
Utah. 
On or about November 9, 1956, plaintiff, as subcontractor, 
confirmed an agreement with the Chemical Plants Division, 
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Blaw-Knox Company, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, as pri-
mary contractor for Columbia Geneva Division, United 
States Steel Corporation, under the terms of which agree-
ment plaintiff was obligated to furnish all materials, sup-
plies, equipment, labor, services, etc., necessary for the 
construction of an ammonium nitrate plant at or near 
Geneva, Utah. 
Article XVIII of this contract (Record pp. 140-174) pro-
vides as follows: 
ARTICLE XVIII. The title to all work completed 
and in the course of construction at the site and all 
materials which are delivered and stored at the site 
and which shall necessarily be incorporated in the 
work, as between Contractor [Blaw-Knox Company], 
Owner [Columbia-Geneva Division, United States Steel 
Corporation] and Subcontractor [Plaintiff] shall be in 
Owner. 
On or about November 23, 1956, the plaintiff confirmed a 
contract (Record pp. 138-139) with The Chemical and In-
dustrial Construction Company, a corporation and a wholly-
owned subsidiary of plaintiff, under the terms of which 
contract The Chemical and Industrial Construction Com-
pany agreed, among other things, to provide all labor and 
services required in the construction of the facilities. 
The first paragraph of ARTICLE I of this contract 
provides: 
ARTICLE I. STATEMENT OF THE WORK 
Subcontractor [The Chemical and Industrial Con-
struction Company] upon notice by Contractor [The 
Chemical and Industrial Corporation], shall as 
promptly and economically as practicable perform the 
necessary work and shall furnish all labor, supervision, 
tools and equipment to erect and install the equipment, 
compressors, machinery and building provided for in 
the Principal Contract. The Subcontractor shall also 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
furnish necessary field offices, shops, warehouses and 
sheds for the proper prosecution of the work and shall 
perform the necessary receiving, unloading, hauling 
from the railhead or other delivery point to the job 
site, warehousing and handling of the materials and 
equipment to be erected and installed under this sub-
contract. 
At all times material hereto, The Chemical and Indus-
trial Construction Company was qualified and authorized 
to do business in the State of Utah. 
Pursuant to plaintiff's contract with the Blaw-Knox 
Company, plaintiff purchased all necessary materials and 
supplies required in the performance of the work on the 
facilities from vendors not residents of the State of Utah 
pursuant to contracts executed outside of the State of 
Utah. No sales taxes were paid to such vendors upon the 
purchase of such materials and supplies. These materials 
were shipped from the vendors' plants or places of busi-
ness in interstate commerce to the plant site at Geneva, 
Utah, where they were received by The Chemical and In-
dustrial Construction Company. 
Plaintiff maintained no office or other place of business 
in Utah prior to, during or subsequent to the period here 
involved, nor were any agents or employees of plaintiff 
located permanently at the plant site or elsewhere in the 
State of Utah. 
On or about July 15, 1957, the defendant issued a pro-
posed use tax tax deficiency assessment against the plain-
tiff for the period January 1, 1956 through December 31, 
1956 in the amount of $20,853.46, plus penalties and interest. 
Thereafter, plaintiff filed its petition for redetermination 
with the defendant in accordance with applicable provi-
sions of the Use Tax Act. An informal hearing was held 
with representatives of the defendant before members of 
the Utah State Tax Commission. At this time a stipulation 
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of facts (Record pp. 149-174) was entered into by the par-
ties and placed before the State Tax Commission. There-
after, on December 10, 1957, pursuant to agreement be-
tween the parties to file seriatum briefs which, together 
with the stipulation of facts, would form the basis for the 
State Tax Commission to render its decision, plaintiff filed 
its brief with applicable authorities setting forth its posi-
tion with respect to the imposition of liability upon it. 
On September 15, 1958, the defendant transmitted a 
Request for Admission of the Genuineness of a Document 
(Record p. 67) to plaintiff, to which plaintiff answered 
(Record pp. 68-72) objecting to the Request on the grounds 
that such Request was not in compliance with Rule 36 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and was otherwise im-
proper. No ruling was made by the defendant on the 
Request or on plaintiff's answer thereto. 
Subsequently, defendant's brief and plaintiff's reply 
brief were filed. No determination was made by the Utah 
State Tax Commission as a result of the first hearing, but 
instead on April 30, 1959, the defendant issued additional, 
identical deficiency assessments in the amount of $20,853.46, 
plus penalties and interest against The Chemical and In-
dustrial Construction Company, The Blaw-Knox Company 
and United States Steel Corporation. An informal hearing 
was held at the offices of the Commission on July 9, 1959, 
at which representatives of all four taxpayers were pres-
ent. On July 14, 1959, the defendant sustained the use tax 
deficiencies against all four taxpayers~ 
On November 12, 1959, a formal hearing was held at the 
offices of the Commission, at which representatives of all 
four taxpayers were present (Record pp. 4-46). At this 
hearing, several iinportant procedural and substantive 
questions were raised as to the validity and propriety of 
n1ultiple assessments of the same tax and as to conducting 
a hearing involving all four taxpayers. This hearing was 
adjourned without such questions having been resolved. 
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On or about l\!Iarcb 25, 1960, the defendant terminated 
the assessn1ents against r:I.,he Chemical and Industrial Con-
struction Company, the Blaw-Knox Company, and the 
United States Steel Corporation, and the adjourned hear-
ing of November 12, 1959 was reconvened on May 10, 1960 
(Record pp. 47-55). The sole purpose of this hearing was 
the introduction into evidence of the prime contract be-
tween the Blaw-I{nox Company and Columbia-Geneva 
Division, United States Steel Corporation dated July 6, 
1956, and the receipt of testimony by the State Tax Com-
mission of the interpretation of this contract by an em-
ployee of Columbia-Geneva Division, United States Steel 
Corporation. Pursuant to agreement between the parties, 
plaintiff was not personally represented at this hearing, 
but filed written objections to the introduction of evidence 
and testimony at such hearing (Record pp. 56-61). 
On September 21, 1960, the defendant issued its decision 
numbered 186, entitled ''In the :Matter of the Sales and Use 
Tax Deficiency of Chmnical and Industrial Corporation,'' 
wherein the defendant detennined that the plaintiff was 
liable for the payment of a use tax deficiency in the amount 
of $20,853.46, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum. 
In its decision, in addition to the above (excepting the 
matter of passage of title to the materials under Article 
XVIII of pla.intiff's contract, on which defendant 1nade no 
finding), the defendant made the following three additional 
findings of fact based upon the evidence produced at the 
hearing of 1\Iay 10, 1960: (1) that pursuant to the afore-
mentioned prime contract, the Blaw-Knox Company was 
required to provide all labor, materials, supplies, etc. not 
furnished by Columbia-Geneva Division, United States 
Steel Corporation, necessary for the construction of the 
facilities ·which vvere the subject of the contract and that 
the ''risk of loss'' until con1pletion and acceptance by the 
Owner, rnited States Steel Corporation, was on the Con-
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tractor, Blaw-Knox Company; (2) that pursuant to such 
contract, the Contractor was required to pay all sales, use, 
excise and other local taxes; and (3) that this contract was 
denominated a "turnkey" contract by the parties, i.e., one 
in which the seller or contractor agrees to furnish a com-
pletely installed operating plant or facility, and that final 
payment therefor is deferred until such plant or facility is 
accepted by the purchaser. 
Based upon such facts, the defendant made three conclu-
sions of law: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the 
materials at the time they ended their transit in interstate 
commerce; (2) that the plaintiff was present within the 
State of Utah and in possession of the materials used in 
the construction of the facility during a taxable moment; 
and (3) that the assessment of the deficiency does not 
unduly burden interstate commerce under the Commerce 
Clause or violate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 
On October 20, 1960, plaintiff posted bond satisfactory to 
the defendant in compliance with Section 59-16-13 of the 
Utah Code, Annotated, and filed its petition for a writ of 
certiorari to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. OWNERSHIP OF l\iATERIALS UPON WHICH A 
USE TAX IS ASSESSED IS ESSENTIAL TO A "USE'' 
OR "STORAGE" OF' SUCH J\!IATERIALS UNDER 
THE UTAH USE TAX ACT OF 1937, AS AMENDED. 
A. AT THE TIME THE MATERIALS ENDED 
THEIR TRANSIT IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
AND BECAME SUBJECT TO THE IMPOSITION 
OF THE USE TAX PLAINTIFF WAS NOT THE 
OWNER THEREOF, AND THEREFORE, THERE 
WAS NO "TAXABLE MOMENT" DURING 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
WHitjH PLAINTIFF vVAS SUBJECT TO THE 
Il\1POSITION OF SUCH TAX. 
II. PLAINTIFF WAS NOT PRESENT WITHIN THE 
STATE OF UTAH AT THE TI:ME THE MATERIALS 
WERE "USED" OR "STORED" IN THE CONSTRUC-
TION PROCESS, AND THEREFORE IS NOT SUBJECT 
TO THE TAXING POWER OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
III. TI-IE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION IN AS-
SERTING THE LIABILITY FOR THE PAYMENT OF 
A USE TAX AGAINST PLAINTIFF, IS ACTING BE-
YOND THE SCOPE OF ITS AUTHORITY, SUCH 
ACTION BEING IN VIOLATION OF THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
IV. THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION IM-
PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE A CON-
TRACT AND CERTAIN TESTIMONY RELATING 
THERETO, BETWEEN THIRD PERSONS NOT PAR-
TIES TO THIS PROCEEDING. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Ownership of Materials upon Which a Use Tax Is As-
sessed Is Essential to a "Use" or "Storage" of Such 
Materials Under the Utah Use Tax Act of 1937, as 
Amended. 
From the inception of this proceeding plaintiff's posi-
tion has been that a use tax could not be asserted against 
a person who was not the owner of tangible personal prop-
erty at the time of the ''storage, use or other consumption'' 
under the express terms of the Utah Use Tax Act of 1937, 
as amended, and that since title to the materials which 
were the subject of the assessment passed from the plain-
tiff under the terms of its contract with the Blaw-Knox 
Company at the exact moment of the termination of their 
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transit in interstate ·commerce, plaintiff could not be sub-
ject to liability for the payment of the tax asserted. 
Article XVIII of plaintiff's contract with the Blaw-Knox 
Company provides : 
ARTICLE XVIII. The title to all work completed 
and in the course of construction at the site and all 
materials which are delivered and stored at the site 
and which shall necessarily be incorporated into the 
work, as between Contractor [Blaw-Knox Company], 
Owner [United States Steel Corporation] and Sub-
contractor [The Chemical and Industrial Corporation] 
shall be in Owner. 
Initially and throughout the early stages of this dispute, 
the defendant sought to impose liability for the payment 
of a use tax upon plaintiff pursuant to the terms of Sec-
tions 59-16-3 and 59-16-2(b), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1956), 
the first of which section provides: 
There is levied and imposed an excise tax on the 
storage, use or other consumption in this state of tan-
gible personal property purchased on or after July 1, 
1937, for storage, use or other consumption in this 
state at the rate of two per cent of the sale price of 
such property. 
Every person storing, using· or consuming in this 
state tangible personal property purchased shall be 
liable for the tax imposed by this Act, and the liability 
therefore shall not be extinguished until the tax has 
been paid to this state. 
The term "use" is defined in Section 59-16-2 (b), Utah 
Code Ann. ( Supp. 1956) as : 
''Use'' nwans and includes the exercise of any right 
or power over tangible personal property incident to 
the ownership of that property, except that it shall not 
include the sale, display, demonstration, or trial of 
that property in the regular course of business and 
held for resale. 
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At the formal hearing held on November 12, however, the 
defendant receded from its original position that there was 
a taxable "use" by the plaintiff, and asserted at that time 
that the basis of the imposition of the use tax upon plain-
tiff was that title to the materials did not pass until they 
were stored at the site and since plaintiff had ''stored'' the 
materials in question it was liable for the use tax by reason 
of such storage. 
Section 59-16-2(a) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1956) pro-
vides as follows : 
"Storage" means and includes any keeping or re-
tention in this state for any purpose except sale in 
the regular course of business all tangible personal 
property purchased from a retailer. 
Plaintiff believes that the defendant's construction of 
Article ·XVIII is erroneous, that title to the materials 
passed upon delivery, and that the use of the phrase ''and 
stored" is intended simply to distinguish between: (1) 
materials which are immediately incorporated "in the 
course of construction" of the work upon delivery; and 
(2) materials which would be stored temporarily before 
incorporation "in the course of construction" of the work, 
in order to insure that title to all items, regardless of the 
status of completion of the project, would be in the Owner. 
Even assuming the correctness of defendant's construc-
tion of Article XVIII, plaintiff submits that the assertion 
of liability on the basis of distinction between a "use" 
and a ''storage,'' as applied to the facts in this case, is a 
distinction without substance or legal effect and provides 
no basis for the imposition of the use tax upon plaintiff in 
this case. 
Apparently the defendant is under the impression that 
ownership of tangible personal property is not an essen-
tial condition to the imposition of the use tax where the 
liability is asserted on the basis of ''storage'' rather than 
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"use." Plaintiff submits that the defendant's assumption 
is incorrect and not supported by the authorities. 
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167 (1939), 
the Supreme Court upheld the application of the California 
Use Tax Act where the taxpayer, the Southern Pacific 
Company, purchased goods outside of the State of Cali-
fornia for delivery at its various places of operation within 
the State of California. In rejecting the argument of the 
taxpayer that the particular items of tangible personal 
property involved were not subject to the imposition of a 
use tax by reason of the fact that these materials upon 
arrival at their destination at the company's places of 
business in California were immediately placed into its 
business operations which were in interstate commerce, 
the court stated at 177: 
We think there was a taxable moment when the former 
[materials] had reached the end of their interstate 
transportation and had not begun to be consumed in 
interstate operation. At that moment the tax on stor-
age and use-retention and exercise of a right of own-
ership, respectively-was effective. (Emphasis added.) 
In a companion case, Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 
306 U.S. 182 (1939), the Supreme Court stated at 187: 
The appellant exercised two rights of ownership 
in California-retention and installation-after the 
termination of the interstate shipment and before the 
use or consumption on its mixed interstate and intra-
state telephone system. We see no material distinc-
tion between the contentions of the appellant and those 
disposed of in Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher . ... 
It is noted that in both these decisions there was no 
question of passage of title or change of ownership of the 
materials involved. In addition, it is also important to 
note that the definitions of "use" and "storage" were iden-
tical to those contained in the Utah Act. 
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Clearly the tax imposed in these decisions was based 
upon the fact that the taxpayers had retained and exer-
cised rights of ownership in the property and it was these 
acts which gave rise to the validity of the application of 
the tax in those cases. 
Similarly, in Avco Mfg. Corp. v. Connelly, 145 Conn. 
161, 140 A.2d 479 (1958), the Supreme Court of Errors 
of Connecticut, in construing the provisions of its Use 
Tax Act, which provisions are substantially the same as 
those utilized in the Utah Act, stated at 173, 140 A.2d at 
485: 
It seems clear that storage and consumption as well 
as use, must be incident to ownership for the use tax 
to apply. To construe the statute otherwise, so as to 
purport to tax the use of the facilities under the cLr-
cumstances in this case would raise a constitutional 
question where, as here, the owner was the United 
States. 
Thus the question of ownership of the materials at the 
time when they became subject to the taxing power of the 
state is critical in any determination of liability for the 
payment of a use tax. It is equally clear that in order to 
subject plaintiff to liability for the payment of the use 
tax in the present case, the "taxable moment" at which 
time the materials here involved became subject to the 
levy of a use tax by the State of Utah, must occur prior 
to the change in ownership of the materials. 
A. At the Time the Materials Ended Their Transit in In-
terstate Commerce and Became Subject to the Imposi-
tion of the Use Tax Plaintiff Was Not the Owner 
Thereof, and Therefore, There Was No "Taxable Mo-
ment" During Which Plaintiff Was Subject to the Im-
position of Such Tax. 
The principle that a state excise tax upon the privilege 
of operating in, or carrying on interstate commerce is in-
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valid, is so well established that citations of authority to 
support it are unnecessary. However, it is also well estab-
lished that there is a point at which the interstate transit 
is completed but the interstate consumption has not begun. 
At this point materials may be subjected to a nondiscrimi-
tory state tax levied upon the exercise of a right of owner-
ship in the property. Pacific Tel. <f; Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 
supra; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). 
Thus, in addition to the matter of the change of owner-
ship, the determination of the point at which the inter-
state transit is completed is also of critical importance in 
the application of state use tax acts. 
The landmark case in this area of the law is Minnesota 
v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1 (1933). In this decision the Supreme 
Court set forth the standard for a determination of when 
interstate transportation is ended and property becomes 
subject to the taxing power of the states. The Court stated 
at 10: 
Formalities, such as the forms of billing, and mere 
changes in the method of transportation do not affect 
the continuity of transit. The question is always one 
of substance, and in each case it is necessary to con-
sider the particular occasion or purpose of the inter-
ruption during which the tax is sought to be levied .... 
Where property has come to rest within a State, 
being held there at the pleasure of the owner, for dis-
posal or use, so that he may dispose of it ·within the 
State or· for shipment elsewhere, as his interest dic-
tates, it is deemed to be a part of the general mass of 
property within the State and is thus subject to its 
taxing power. 
This Court has expressed its agreen1ent with the stand-
ard established in the Blasius case. In Geneva Steel Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949), 
this Court stated at 176, 269 P.2d at 211: 
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The sal(' of property made outside this state is not 
subject to our sales tax, it being a sale which this 
state cannot constitutionally tax. But when such prop-
erty is brought into this state for storage, use or other 
consumption here, thus coming to rest as an integrated 
part of the total property in this state, then the use 
tax goes into operation and taxes, not the event of the 
sale of the property, but the event of storage, use or 
other consumption of that property within this state. 
Although it would appear to be hypertechnical to require 
some further clarification of the above standard for deter-
minii_lg when interstate transportation ends, probably no 
other area of the law has involved so many decisions in 
which the validity and applicability of various state laws 
have turned upon just such technical distinctions. 
Fortunately, ho·wever, this Court has been called upon in 
the past to detern1ine the precise question ·with which we 
are presently concerned-that point in time when inter-
state transportation of tangible personal property ends. In 
illud Control Laboratories v. Covey, 2 Utah2d -85, 269 P.2d 
83-l- (1954), the plaintiff was attempting to assert a cause 
of action for breach of contract in the courts of Utah. The 
lower court returned a judgn1ent for the plaintiff for a 
portion of its claim, but held that it was not entitled to 
maintain an action in Utah for n1aterials sold prior to the 
time it qualified to do business in Utah. Plaintiff, on ap-
peal, contended that the sales n1ade prior to qualification 
·were in interstate commerce and therefore there ''·'as no 
requirement of qualification. This Court stated at 89, 269 
P.2d at 856-7: 
The principles in the foregoing cases are applicable 
to the fact situation \Ye have here. :Mud Control prod-
ucts were trucked into Vernal, Utah, ·where they were 
placed on the property of one L. N. Liscmnbe and 
there kept under tarpaulins pending sale .... · vVhen 
such products were deposited for warehousing subject 
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to distribution upon orders to be taken, their transit 
in interstate commerce had come to an end. Subse-
quent sales by Mud Control were intrastate commerce 
and subject to regulation by the laws of Utah. 
The above authorities establish two essential elements 
to the imposition of liability for the payment of a use tax: 
(1) In order to be subject to a tax, the "use" or "storage" 
must be based upon the exercise of some right of owner-
ship over the property upon which the tax is sought to 
be levied; (2) the taxable "event" or "moment" must occur 
after the property has come to rest in the state and after 
the interstate transportation of the materials has ended. 
Returning now to Article XVIII of plaintiff's contract, it 
is apparent that title to the materials passed to Columbia-
Geneva Division, United States Steel Corporation at the 
moment of delivery at the site or at the very latest no later 
than at the exact ~oment those materials were placed on 
the ground at the plant site near Geneva, Utah. There 
can be little doubt as to the meaning of this provision of 
the contract and it is axiomatic that clear, unequivocal 
language of a contract will be given effect. In those deci-
sions where similar contract language was considered, the 
courts clearly indicated that title to materials utilized in 
construction contracts passed according to the terms of 
the contract. See· Alabama v. King&; Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 
(1941); Ford J. Twaits Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343 (1944); General Motors Corp. 
v. State Ta.x Commission, 182 Kan. 213, 320 P.2d 807 
(1958), cert. den. 358 U. S. 875 (1958). 
It is equally clear that the interstate transportation of 
the materials with which we are here concerned did not 
terminate until such materials were deposited on the ground 
at the plant site near Geneva, Utah. 
The fallacy of the defendant's Conclusions of Law that 
plaintiff was the owner of the Inaterials at the time they 
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ended their interstate transportation and was in posses-
sion thereof during a "taxable moment" thus becomes 
readily apparent. In order for the plaintiff to be subject 
to liability for the payment of this tax, the "taxable mo-
ment" must occur prior to the storage of materials and at 
some time during the course of delivery. This is, in effect, 
a tax upon the sale of the property rather than upon its 
use or storage and would be an unconstitutional attempt 
by the Utah State Tax Commission to exceed its powers 
and impose a tax where no right to assert such a tax 
exists. In this connection, the admonition of the Supreme 
Court in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., supra, and in Mc-
Leod v. J. E. Dillworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 331 (1943), is 
significant. In the Silas Mason Co. case the Court stated 
at 583: 
A tax upon a use so closely connected with delivery 
as to be in substance a part thereof, might be subject 
to the same objections that would be applicable to tax 
upon the sale itself. 
This statement was repeated and reaffirmed in the J. E. 
Dillworth case. 
And in Mill.er Bros. v. Maryland; 347 U. S. 340 (1954), 
the Court stated at 344: 
We do not understand the State to contend that it 
could lay a use tax upon mere possession of goods in 
transit by a carrier or vendor upon entering the State 
nor do we see how such tax could be consistent with 
the Commerce Clause. 
Conversely, if it is the intent of the defendant that the 
"taxable moment" occurred at a point any time after the 
materials were placed upon the ground at the plant site, 
the plaintiff would still not be subject to the tax since 
plaintiff was then no longer the owner of the materials 
and the exercise of a right of ownership is an essential ele-
ment of a valid levy of the use tax. 
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II. Plaintiff Was Not Present within the State of Utah at 
the Time the Materials Were "Used" or "Stored" in the 
Construction Process, and Therefore Is Not Subject to 
the Ta,xing Power of the State of Utah. 
In addition to the above there is a third element essen-
tial to a valid levy of a state use tax: that the owner be 
present within the state at the time the taxable use occurs. 
The question of "presence" in the state of the forum of 
foreign corporations, not only for purposes of taxation, but 
also for purposes of service of process and qualification to 
do business, has been one of the most frequently litigated 
questions in the area of constitutional law. 
Although the cases in this area are legion, it is almost 
impossible to ascertain any overriding principle which will 
be determinative in all sets of circumstances. It is gener-
ally agreed, however, that there are different degrees of 
"presence" or "doing business" for purposes of determin-
ing whether or not a foreign corporation is subject to the 
laws of the state of the forum for service of process, quali-
fication and taxation. Most authorities are in accord that 
some sort of continuing business activity is necessary in 
order to require the qualification of a foreign corporation. 
Business activity amounting to something less than that 
of a continuing nature is required to subject a foreign cor-
poration to the taxing power of the state in "'Nhich such 
activity is conducted, and finally, still less activity is re-
quired in order to subject a foreign corporation to service 
of process in the state of the forum. 
This Court has recently revie·wed the significant cases in 
the area of jurisdiction for purposes of serYice of process 
and has most succinctly set forth the broad standard or 
guide in determining the question. In Conn v. TVhitmore, 
9 Utah2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959) this Court stated at 254: 
Even under the liberalized view the foregoing cases 
represent as to the prerequisites to holding one subject 
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to personal jurisdiction of courts of a foreign state, this 
requirement remains: there must be some substantial 
activity which correlates with a purpose to engage in 
a course of business or some continuity of activity in 
the state so that deeming the defendant to be present 
therein is founded upon a realistic basis and is not a 
mere fiction. That this is so and that a single act or 
transaction does not suffice unless it fits into the above 
pattern, is well established. 
In the more limited area of decisions dealing with juris-
diction for purposes of service of process over foreign 
corporations engaged in the sale of goods and their delivery 
within the state of the forum, the Supreme Court of Utah 
in Dykes v. R.eliable Furniture & Carpet, 3 Utah2d 34, 277 
P.2d 969 (1954) held that the defendant seller with no 
office, files, facilities, equipment, books, bank accounts, tele-
phone listing, advertising, samples, property, or employees 
in Utah, and whose orders were secured by an independent 
contractor who submitted them to the defendant for ac-
ceptance, was not doing business within the state for pur-
poses of service of process. This Court stated at 36, 277 
P.2d at 971: 
We believe the principles heretofore announced by 
us are applicable to this case and support our conclu-
sion, as are the decisions of many respectable author-
ities elsewhere. All authorities are not in complete 
harmony but most agree that certain activities do not 
constitute "doing business" in the jurisdictional sense, 
giving us a few guide posts to detennine cases as they 
arise. That mere solicitation cannot confer jurisdic-
tion, all will agree. In the vVestern Gas Appliances' 
case, cited herein, 1Ir. Justice Crockett pointed out a 
number of other activities authoritatively determined 
as not "doing business" for process purposes; 1) mere 
presence of an officer in the forum, 2) a factory sale 
to a local distributor, 3) instruction to retailers in aid 
of distributors' aid promotion, 4) warranting and ship-
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ping parts to an independent dealer, 5) isolated cases 
of equipment installation. Others might be added. 
In the area of jurisdiction for purposes of qualification, 
in Riley Stoker Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 3 Utah2d 
164, 280 P.2d 967 (1955) the appellant sold, delivered and 
constructed four large steam generating plants in the State 
of Utah. It contended this activity was interstate commerce 
and that it was not liable for the payment of corporate 
franchise taxes. This Court stated at 167, 280 P.2d at 968: 
It is recognized that not only contracts for the sale 
and shipment of machinery or equipment from out of 
the state into Utah are interstate commerce, but fur-
ther that incidental services in assembling, inspecting 
and testing of such equipment does not deprive it of its 
interstate character. 
Here the court held that the appellant's activities in Utah 
were more than merely "incidental" to the sale and ship-
ment of the goods. 
If the defendant in the Reliable Furniture d!; Carpet case 
was not present for purposes of service of process and if 
shipment of goods and some incidental assembling services 
does not amount to presence for purposes of qualification 
under the Riley Stoker Corp. case, it is clear that plaintiff, 
who engaged in no activities within the State of Utah, is 
likewise not subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah 
for purposes of service of process, qualification or taxation. 
Apparently the defendant is attempting to ascribe the 
presence of The Chemical and Industrial Construction 
Company in Utah to the plaintiff, regarding them as one 
for purposes of asserting the liability for the payment of 
the use tax in this case. Plaintiff submits that no legal 
basis or justification exists for such a determination. 
At no time did plaintiff enter into the State of Utah to 
engage In, supervise or in any way or manner direct the 
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construction of the facilities at or near Geneva, Utah. All 
of the construction work, including the direction and super-
vision thereof, was performed by The Chemical and Indus-
trial Construction Company to whom plaintiff subcon-
tracted the work of erecting these facilities. In order to 
sustain a finding that plaintiff was present in the State of 
Utah for purposes of the application of the use tax, it will 
be necessary to disregard the separate corporate entities 
of the two firms, or to show that The Chemical and Indus-
trial Construction Company was merely an agent or instru-
mentality of plaintiff. Neither of these determinations is 
supported by law. 
The mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship, 
even though the parent exercises considerable control over 
the affairs of the subsidiary, is not sufficient basis for dis-
regarding the separate corporate entities, nor does such a 
relationship of itself constitute the subsidiary an "agent" 
of the parent company. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Pack-
ing Co., 267 U. S. 333 (1925). 
Unless it appears that a true agency relationship exists 
between a parent corporation and its subsidiary, the sepa-
rate identities of the corporations will not be disregarded 
for tax purposes. Thus, in Board of Tax Supervisors v. 
Baldwin Piano Co., 296 Ky. 673, 178 S.W.2d 212 (1944) it 
appeared that The Baldwin Company was the sole owner of 
The Baldwin Piano Company, except for qualifying shares, 
the former being the manufacturing company and not 
authorized or qualified to do . business in the State of 
Kentucky; the latter being a sales company and qualified 
to do business in Kentucky. The Baldwin Piano Company 
purchased musical instruments from The Baldwin Com-
pany, the latter crediting on its books the purchase price of 
the instruments sold. As the sales company sold the instru-
ments in Kentucky, they assigned their accounts receivable 
to the parent company, these accounts being entered on the 
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books of The Baldwin Company offsetting the amounts due 
on the purchase price of the instruments. The State of 
Kentucky sought to impose an intangible tax on these ac-
counts receivable, contending that the Piano Company was 
merely a cloak used to defraud the state out of its taxes 
and as such the two corporations should be regarded as 
one entity for tax purposes. The Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky denied the contentions of the Board of T·ax Super-
visors, stating at 678, 178 S.W.2d at 214: 
Here Piano was not formed to shield Baldwin from 
liability for fraud or unethical business transactions . 
. . . Piano was not. the mere agent or instrumentality 
of Baldwin, nor were the business affairs between them 
fictional, nor was the method of doing business a plan 
to illegally evade taxes. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. 
Comm., 208 Ky. 606,271 S.W. 693. 
Similarly, in State ex rel. Porterie v. Gulf, Mobile & N. 
R.R., 191 La. 163, 184 So. 711 (1938) the court held that an 
almost wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant was liable 
for the payment of an excise tax upon gasoline imported 
into Louisiana, rather than the parent company, as con-
tended by the Louisiana taxing authorities. Here the two 
companies had practically the same managerial personnel, 
principal officers and boards of directors. They operated 
out of the same general offices. One man, acting as pur-
chasing agent for the two corporations, ordered gasoline 
in the parent's name, the gasoline being consigned to the 
subsidiary in Louisiana, stored there and subsequently 
used by the subsidiary in the course of its business opera-
tions within the state. 
Since the contract here involved was executed in Ohio 
and is governed by Ohio law, the decisions of the Ohio 
courts 1nust be considered. In Cou,ncell v. D.ouglas, 163 
Ohio St. 292, 126 N.E.2d 597 (1957) the Supreme Court of 
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Ohio elaborated on the test to be applied in determining 
whether the relationship between parties is that of ''prin-
cipal and agent'' or "employer and independent contractor" 
when it quoted with approval the syllabus of an earlier 
Ohio decision, Hughes v. Railway Co., 39 Ohio St. 461 
(1883) at 296-297, 126 N.E.2d at 600: 
'' 2. A corporation organized for the purpose of con-
structing and operating a railroad ... may contract 
with another person for the construction of the whole 
or any part of the road, without retaining the right to 
control the mode or manner of doing the work. ... 
3. But if the corporation retain control over the 
mode and manner of doing the work, the relation of 
independent contractor does not exist. . . . 
4. A right reserved in the contract, on the part of 
the railroad company, to direct as to the quantity of 
work to be done, or the condition of the work when 
completed is not a right to control the mode or manner 
of doing the work, within the rule above stated. 
This basic principle has been approved in almost·all Amer-
ican jurisdictions, including Utah. See Dayton v. Free, 46 
Utah 277, 148 Pac. 408 (1914). 
The terms of plaintiff's contract with The Chemical and 
Industrial Construction Company make it abundantly clear 
that plaintiff retained no right to control the mode or 
manner of the doing of the work. All supervison was to 
be provided by the subcontractor, subject only to plaintiff's 
right of final acceptance upon the completion of the work. 
It is submitted, in the light of the above, that the rela-
tionship between plaintiff and The Chemical and Industrial 
Construction Company is that of employer and independent 
contractor; that there is no basis for attributing an agency 
relationship to such agreement or for disregarding the legal 
entity of these corporations, and, accordingly, plaintiff was 
not present within the State of Utah. Thus plaintiff could 
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not have "used" or "stored" in Utah the materials upon 
which tax liability is asserted. 
III. The· State Tax Commission in Asserting Liability for 
the Payment of a Use Tax against. Plaintiff Is Acting 
beyond the Scope of Its Authority, Such Action Being 
in Violation of the Commerce Clause and the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
It is a well settled principle of constitutional law that the 
taxing power of a state is limited to subjects within its 
jurisdiction, and that the seizure of property by the state 
under pretext of taxation when there is no jurisdiction or 
power to tax is simple confiscation and a denial of due 
process of law. Thus, in the early case of St. Louis v. 
Wiggins Ferry Co., 78 U. S. (11 Wall.) 423, 430 (1871) it 
was said: 
''Where there is jurisdiction neither as to person 
nor property, the imposition of a tax would be ultra 
vir-es and void. If the legislature of a state should 
enact that citizens or property of another state or 
country should be taxed in the same manner as per-
sons and property within its own limits and subject 
to its authority, or in any manner whatsoever, such a 
law would be as much a nullity as if in conflict with 
the most explicit constitutional inhibition. Jurisdic-
tion is as necessary to valid legislative as to valid 
judicial action .... ' ' 
Before there can be a valid exercise of the state's taxing 
power over persons not present within its borders, it must 
appear that there is a sufficient connection, certain mini-
mum contracts sufficient to satisfy the demands of due 
process between the person upon whom the tax is sought to 
be imposed and the state seeking to exert such taxing 
power. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 
(1945) ; Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 344-5 
(1954). 
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The question in each case is whether the person upon 
whom the tax is sought to be imposed, by its acts or course 
of dealing, has subjected itself to the taxing power of the 
state. There can be little question as to the validity, in so 
far as. constitutional questions of due process of law are 
concerned, of a state use tax applied to a corporation which 
enters into the taxing state, conducts part of its business 
operations there and actually uses items of tangible per-
sonal property in that state even though such items were 
purchased outside of the taxing state. Pacific Tel. <f; Tel. 
Co. v. Gallagher, supra; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 
s'upra. Similarly, where a foreign corporation has localized 
its business within the taxing state by maintaining either 
its general offices, Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, supra, 
or a branch office from which permanent general agents 
operate, Felt <f; Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 
62 ( 1939), or storage and refining facilities, M onamotor 
Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86 (1934), the imposition of 
a use tax has been sustained. In each of the cases the 
person upon whom tax liability was imposed had, by its 
acts and manner of conducting business, engaged in busi-
ness activities within the taxing state, and by so doing 
had subjected itself to the taxing power of that state. 
However, plaintiff is aware of no decided case which im-
posed tax liability upon a foreign corporation under cir-
cumstances approximating those in the instant case. There 
was no solicitation of business within the state of Utah; no 
office or place of business was maintained there, and no 
employees of plaintiff conducted any of plaintiff's business 
from within the state; and none of the contracts involved 
herein were made in Utah. Plaintiff's only link with the 
state of Utah was the delivery, by common carrier, of goods 
purchased outside of the state of Utah pursuant to contracts 
made outside of Utah, to the job site at Geneva, Utah. 
Thus, tpere was no "nexus," no "minimum contacts" with 
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the state of Utah to support, consistent with constitutional 
"due process," the imposition of the tax in this case. 
What has been stated previously with reference to the 
matter of the termination of the interstate transportation 
of these materials, makes it equally clear that the assertion 
of a use tax against plaintiff here is contrary to the prin-
ciples announced in the Blasius; Silas Mason Co., and Covey 
cases: that a tax upon the interstate transportation of 
goods, rather than a tax upon their use, storage or other 
consumption once they have come to rest and become a part 
of the mass of property within the state, places an undue 
burden upon interstate commerce within the meaning of the 
Commerce Clause of the U. S. Constitution. 
It is submitted that the principles set forth in the above 
decisions are decisive of the· question of the constitutional 
validity of the Utah use tax as applied to plaintiff. The 
Chemical and Industrial Corporation did not engage in any 
business activities in the state of Utah which would subject 
it to the taxing power of that state. Nor can phiintiff's 
presence in the state of Utah be attributed to the facl that 
the construction work was perforn1ed and supervised by 
The Chemical and Industrial Construction Company. The 
imposition of such tax by the State Tax Con1mission is an 
unconstitutional attempt to extend the taxing power of the 
state over subjects not within its jurisdiction in contraven-
tion of the C01nmerce Clause mi.d the Fourteenth Arnend-
Inent to the U. S. Constitution. 
IV. The Utah State Tax Commission Improperly Admitted 
into Evidence a Contract and Certain Testimony Relat-
ing Thereto, betwe·en Third Persons Not Parties to 
This Proceeding. 
The defendant has exerted considerable effort in the 
proceedings below to have the contract between the Chem-
ical Plants Division, Bla\Y-l(nox C01npany and Columbia 
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Geneva Division, U. S. Steel Corporation (Record pp. 80-
131) admitted into evidence, apparently on the assumption 
that this contract is somehow determinative of the question 
of passage of title to the materials used in the construction 
of the facilities at Geneva, Utah. Plaintiff has maintained 
throughout these proceedings that this contract is not 
determinative of the matter of passage of title to the 
materials involved but also, being a contract between third 
persons not parties to this proceeding, is not relevant or 
material to the issues involved here, and is otherwise 
incompetent. 
In General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220 (7th 
Cir. 1948), wherein a decision of an administrative officer of 
the Commodity Credit Corporation was reversed, the court 
stated at 225: 
The government cites no authority in support of its 
right to use proof as to the statements and activities 
of one party against another in the absence of a con-
spiracy, agreement or a relationship kindred thereto . 
. . . It is true, of course, as asserted by the government, 
that strict rules of procedure, including the admissi-
bility of evidence, inherent in criminal and common 
law proceedings are not applicable to administrative 
proceedings. But no court, as far as we are aware, 
and we do not propose to be the first, has held in an 
administrative proceeding or any other kind that one 
person can be responsible for the actions of another in 
the absence of a conspiracy or agreement. 
Cf. Saxton v. TV. S. Askew Co., 38 F.Supp. 323 (N. D. Ga. 
1941). 
Similarly, in Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Unemploy1nent 
C01npensation Board of Review, 168 Pa. Super, 534, 79 
A.2d 796 (1951), the Superior Court reversed a proceeding 
of the Unemployment Compensation Board where the 
Board admitted into evidence a letter from a person not a 
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party to the proceeding over objection by one of the 
parties. The court stated that this document was incom-
petent and inadmissible. Although the Board was not re-
quired to conform to the common law or statutory rules of 
evidence, where a timely objection is made to incompetent 
evidence, it is nevertheless not admissible. See also Phillips 
v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 152 Pa. 
Super. 75, 30 A.2d 718 (1943). 
Although the contract in question has some remote rele-
vancy to the question of the passage of title to the materials 
involved, this relevancy lacks sufficient materiality to this 
question to justify its admission into evidence by the State 
Tax Commission. Its admission, in addition to the fact 
that it is incompetent evidence in this proceeding, served 
merely to confuse the issues involved and to unduly pro-
long the proceedings. Once having been admitted, however, 
it is clear that the entire contract must be examined and 
considered in order to ascertain its effect. 
Contrary to the construction placed upon this contract 
by the defendant, an examination of the entire contract 
supports plaintiff's position with respect to the matter of 
the passage of title to materials upon which the tax is 
asserted. Although there is no provision in this contract 
equivalent to Article XVIII of plaintiff's contract with the 
Blaw-Knox Company, Paragraph 5 does provide, in part: 
. . . Owner shall pay Contractor progress payments 
on account of the contract price against estimates of 
percentage of completion made by Contractor and ap-
proved by Owner for ninety per cent (90%) of the 
proportionate price of services rendered, materials and 
equipment delivered, field work performed and other 
expenses incurred, said payments to be made by Owner 
within ten (10) days af~er submission of each invoice 
therefor. . . . (Emphasis added.) 
Under Paragraph 5 the United States Steel Corporation 
is paying for work as it is performed and for materials as 
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they are delivered. There is nothing inconsistent in this 
provision of the contract with a determination that title 
to the materials passed upon delivery at the site. Where a 
person contracts to sell goods and delivers such goods to 
the buyer and the buyer has contracted to pay the seller 
for them, it is a completed sale. Nothing remains to be 
done to effect a transfer of title. See 46 Am. Jur. Sales, 
Sections 411 et seq. (1939); Jones v. Commercial Invest-
ment Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 Pac. 896 (1924). 
A reading of the transcript of the hearing of May 10, 
1960 (Record pp. 47-55) indicates that counsel for the 
defendant was unwilling to rest his case to support his 
contention that the contract alone was determinative of 
the time of passage of title to the materials. After the 
contract was introduced, a series of leading questions 
(Record pp. 52-53) were directed to an employee of the 
United States Steel Corporation, a Mr. Maynard Gage, 
which elicited the desired testimony: to the effect that the 
interpretation placed upon this contract by Mr. Gage (or 
United States Steel) was that title to the materials did not 
pass until completion and final acceptance of the contract. 
These questions and the answers they elicited were 
highly improper and clearly inadmissible on several 
grounds not the least of which is that the conclusions made 
by Mr. Gage are absolutely and unmistakably erroneous. 
First, once the written contract was introduced in evi-
dence, its terms could not be varied, altered, contradicted 
or added to by oral testimony. It is well established that 
oral evidence is not admissible to contradict, add to or vary 
a written instrument. Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 105 
Utah 272, 143 P.2d 281 (1943); Garrett v. Ellison, 93 
Utah 184, 72 P.2d 449 (1937). There is no provision in 
defendant's Exhibit No. 4 covering the passage of title to 
the materials used in the construction of the facilities at 
Geneva, Utah. Mr. Gage, by testifying as to his "inter-
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pretation" of the contract is adding a provision thereto 
which is not contained in its express terms. 
Second, since there is no express provision in the con tract 
relating to the passage of title of the materials, it is clear 
that Mr. Gage is merely expressing his own opinion as to 
this question. There has been no showing that Mr. Gage 
is an "expert" on contract interpretation; that he is by 
training or profession qualified to express such an opinion. 
It is also well established that unless a witness is qualified 
as an expert, he cannot be permitted to express an opinion 
as to a matter to be determined by the trier of fact. 
In Upton v. Heiselt, 118 Utah 573, 223 P.2d 428 (1950) 
the plaintiff, in an action to quiet title to real estate, sought 
to introduce a letter from a referee in bankruptcy in Colo-
rado expressing an opinion as to the tax title of the plain-
tiff to the real estate. The Supreme Court of Utah held that 
such evidence was clearly inadmissible opinion evidence on 
issues that were to be decided by the court in which the 
suit was initiated. 
This rule is equally applicable to administrative pro-
ceedings. In Ryan v. New York State Liquor Authority, 273 
App. Div. 576, 79 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1948), the court stated 
that in administrative proceedings witnesses should not be 
permitted to testify as to their opinions, conclusions and 
inferences. Similarly, in State Board v. Thomasson, 65 
Dauph. 110 (Pa.Com.Pls.) the court held that in a pro-
ceeding before an administrative agency, witnesses may not 
be permitted to express opinions of facts to which they are 
testifying. Testimony which thus amounts to a legal con-
clusion is incompetent and inadmissible. Such conclusions 
are to be drawn only by the administrative body on the 
basis of facts adduced before it. 
Finally, and of particular importance, it is painfully 
obvious that Mr. Gage's "interpretation" of the contract 
is contrary to its terms and contrary to law. \Ve take it 
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that there is no dispute that throughout the period of 
construction the title to the real estate upon which these 
facilities were constructed was in United States Steel Cor-
poration. See in this connection, Geneva Steel Co. v. State 
Tax Commission, supra. There has never been anything, 
in evidence, the correspondence, or otherwise, which would 
indicate that this was not a fact. The only question relates 
to the time of passage of title· to the personalty. Although 
it is far from clear as to which of the provisions of the 
contract Mr. Gage is relying upon to support his "inter-
pretation" of the contract, we assume that it is, at least 
in part, based upon Paragraph 24 thereof. An examination 
of this section discloses, however, no mention or reference 
to any passage of title either to materials used or to the 
plant itself. It is obvious that "acceptance" as used in this 
section relates only to the guarantees of operating per-
formance of the completed facility, a standard provision in 
contracts of this type. 
The contention that "title" to anything passed pursuant 
to the operation of Section 24 is absurd. United States Steel 
Corporation already owned the real estate and in the 
absence of a provision to the contrary in the contract, local 
law must determine the passage of title to personalty. 
It is a uniformly accepted proposition that once per-
sonalty is affixed or annexed to the land, it becomes a part 
of the land and title passes to the landowner. See 22 Am. 
Jur. Fixtures, § 2 (1939). This is the law of Utah. See 
Heiselt Construction Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 176 F.2d 
207 (lOth Cir. 1949); Heiselt Construction Co. v. Garff, 119 
Utah 164, 225 P.2d 720 (1950). Under Paragraph 23 of de-
fendant's Exhibit No. 4, matters relating to the construc-
tion of the contract are expressly made subject to the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
If Mr. Gage's interpretation of the contract were correct 
and if there were a breach of the contract by United States 
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Steel at any time prior to "final acceptance" under the con-
tract, Blaw-Knox would have every right to dismantle the 
entire plant, piece by piece, and haul it away, since, accord-
ing to Mr. Gage, they still had title to the plant. Plaintiff 
has no hesitation in saying that this is not United States 
Steel's understanding of the rights of the parties to this 
contract. 
Throughout the course of the proceedings below the 
defendant has sought to nullify the effect of Article XVIII 
of plaintiff's contract with Blaw-Knox Company by stating 
that plaintiff cannot, by the terms of its contract with 
Blaw-Knox Company, impose liability for the payment of 
the use tax upon Columbia-Geneva Division, United States 
Steel Corporation. Plaintiff has never contended that 
United States Steel was the proper party upon which to 
impose liability for the payment of the tax. Plaintiff's 
position is simply that it is not liable for the payment of 
this tax. In view of the fact that plaintiff has not urged 
defendant to impose liability against any of the other par-
ties to these transactions, defendant's argument would 
appear to have little merit. 
Plaintiff would further direct the court's attention to 
three additional points: (1) It is noted that Article XVIII 
of the contract between plaintiff and Blaw-Knox Company 
is contained in the printed form of contract provided by 
Blaw-Knox Company and accordingly is a part of the 
contract at the direction of Blaw-Knox Company, not 
plaintiff. Provisions similar to Article XVIII of plaintiff's 
contract are frequently included in construction contracts 
at the request of owners because of the protection they 
afford as a defense to possible claims of subcontractors or 
materialmen, i.e., in replevin actions or actions for the 
recovery of the materials delivered. Plaintiff submits that 
this provision was inserted in the contract by Blaw-Knox 
Company for a definite purpose and that such provision 
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cannot be effective for the purpose of protecting the owner 
against claims of subcontractors on the one hand, and ig-
nored when its effect might work to the detriment of the 
owner; (2) In any event, United States Steel Corporation 
protected itself from any tax liability which might result 
from the contract and the construction of the facilities by 
providing in Paragraph 15 that the Contractor (Blaw-Knox 
Company) was required to indemnify and hold the Owner 
(United States Steel Corporation) harmless from any lia-
bility for any state or local taxes; (3) United States Steel 
was certainly aware of the fact that Blaw-Knox intended 
to subcontract a portion of the prime contract to plaintiff. 
The letter of June 1, 1955 from Mr. Lester of the Bla w-
Knox Company to Mr. Purvance (Record pp. 94-95) refers 
to quotations of C. and I. (The Chemical and Industrial 
Corporation). 
In summary it is plaintiff's position that this contract, 
and the testimony relating thereto, were not competent 
evidence in this proceeding and that the adn1ission of such 
evidence was error. Even if the admission of such evidence 
is not deemed reversible error, however, the contract sup-
ports plaintiff's position with respect to the matter of the 
passage of title to the materials used in the construction 
of the facilities for the United States Steel Corporation 
nt GPneva, Utah. 
V. Conclusion. 
Plaintiff could not have "used" or "stored" the n1aterials 
in question in view of the fact that by the express tern1s of 
its contract, the ownership of such materials passed to 
another upon their delivery and storage within the State 
of rtah, nor could plaintiff have "used" or "stored" mate-
rials within the State of Utah as required by the Utah Use 
Tax Act of 1937, as amended, since it did not engage in 
nny activities within the State other than the delivery of 
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materials in interstate commerce to the job site. The activi-
ties of plaintiff's wholly-owned subsidiary are not attribut-
able to it on an agency basis, because under their contract 
a relationship of employer-independent contractor, rather 
than principal and agent, was created. 
Any attempt by the State Tax Commission to subject 
plaintiff to use tax liability under these circumstances con-
stitutes an attempt to expand the scope of its taxing power 
over subjects beyond its lawful control, and as such is in 
contravention of the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution, and, in addition, deprives plaintiff of its 
property without due process of law as g~aranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The State Tax Commission committed error in admitting 
a contract between third persons not parties to the pro-
ceeding below, but even if no error was committed, such 
evidence does not support or provide any basis for the 
conclusions of law determined by the defendant. 
Plaintiff prays that the decision of the defendant, Utah 
State Tax Commission, be reversed and that plaintiff be 
discharged from all liability for payment of any use tax in 
connection therewith. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JERRY L. CowAN, 
FROST & JACOBS, 
2300 Union Central Building, 
Cincinnati 2, Ohio, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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